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I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio courts continually face legal dilemmas surrounding the issue of real
property tax exemptions for religious institutions. Today, two Ohio statutes govern
church exemptions from real property taxes: the church exemption statute1 and the
split listing statute ("the split statute"). 2 Initially, the church exemption statute in
Ohio had been restricted to "houses used exclusively for public worship.' ' However,
the 1949 In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School4 decision recognized that the
statute need not "be so literally construed. "5 In Bond Hill, the primary use test6 was
adopted, modifying the exclusive use language found in the church exemption
statute, thereby making the primary, rather than the exclusive, use of the property
determinative in granting an exemption for church-owned land.7
Only months after the Bond Hill decision the Ohio General Assembly adopted
the split statute. 8 This statute grants exemption to any "separate entity" within a
1. Oino REv. CODE ANm. § 5709.07 (Page 1980). The church exemption statute reads in pertinent part: "[Houses
used exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture therein, and the ground attached to such buildings necessary
for the proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment thereof, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit . . . shall
be exempt from taxation."
2. Omo REv. CODE Ar. § 5713.04 (Page 1980). The split listing statute reads in pertinent part:
If a separate parcel of improved or unimproved real property has a single ownership and is so used so that part
thereof, if a separate entity, would be exempt from taxation, and the balance thereof would not be exempt from
taxation, the listing thereof shall be split, and the part thereof used exclusively for an exempt purpose shall be
regarded as a separate entity and be listed as exempt, and the balance thereof used for a purpose not exempt
shall, with the approaches thereto, be listed at its taxable value and taxed accordingly.
Actually, the split statute was an amendment clause placed between two already-existing clauses in Ohio General Code
§ 5560.
3. Owo REv. CoDE ANN. § 5709.07 (Page 1980) (emphasis added).
4. 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
5. Id. at 73-74, 84 N.E.2d at 272. Justice Taft noted the following series of dilemmas faced by courts interpreting
the exclusive use requirement of the church exemption statute:
There are many activities conducted in church buildings which do not constitute public worship but which are
designed to encourage people to use the church for public worship. The use of a room in the church to entertain
young children while their parents attend church services is not a use for public worship. The use of the church
building for meetings of boy scouts is not a use for public worship. The use of part of the building for the
preparation of food for a church supper and the eating of such food are not uses for public worship. Certainly
it was not the intention of the people that their words "used exclusively for public worship," should be so
literally construed that any such uses would prevent tax exemption of a church building.
Id.
6. The primary use doctrine is a practical solution to the near-impossible standards demanded by exclusive use
statutes. Courts have applied the doctrine to statutes containing exclusive use language. Because primary use is a less
demanding standard than exclusive use, courts employ the doctrine when a strict interpretation of the statute would defeat
the intent. When applied in the field of Ohio's real property tax exemption statutes, the doctrine requires that only the
primary, rather than exclusive, use of the property satisfy the statutory requirements. See infra text accompanying notes
162-64.
7. 151 Ohio St. 70, 75, 84 N.E.2d 270, 273 (1949).
8. Bond Hill was decided on February 16, 1949. The split listing amendment to Ohio Revised Code § 5713.04
(then Ohio General Code § 5560) took effect on October 27, 1949.
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particular lot of real property, so long as that "entity" is "used exclusively for an
exempt purpose.' '9 Under the terms of the split statute, the exemption granted for a
separate entity can be vertical, horizontal, or otherwise. 10 Any qualifying room can
be split from a building and accorded separate tax treatment.
In December of 1982 the Ohio Supreme Court held by a unanimous decision in
Bishop v. Kinney" that the primary use doctrine, previously restricted to cases
involving general property exemption statutes' 2 such as the church exemption statute,
applies to the split statute.13 In effect, the court in Bishop applied parallel statutory
interpretation from the church exemption statute to the similar "used exclusively"
language found in the split statute.' 4 Through Bishop, the Ohio Supreme Court
additionally diluted the statutory requirements of "public worship" to a far more
lenient standard: "religious in nature." 15 Thus, under the current interpretation of the
split statute, as elicited in Bishop, a religious institution need only show that a
separate room in any building is primarily used for public worship that is religious in
nature in order to gain exemption status for the property underneath it.
Although the supreme court hailed its decision in Bishop as a practical one,
numerous negative repercussions have reverberated throughout the field of tax ex-
emptions, and more can be expected. The broad interpretation of the two exemption
statutes has complicated an already entangled judicial field. Bishop is the first in a
series of Ohio Supreme Court decisions that has clouded the state's taxing system in
the field of church real property exemptions. The purpose of this Note is to analyze
the expansive repercussions of Bishop and to propose alternative methods for dealing
with applications for exemption from real property taxes, focusing on church exemp-
tions and the relationship between the church exemption statute and the split statute.
This Note will begin by addressing the constitutional issues raised by the
taxation and exemption of church property, followed by a discussion of the
foundations of real property taxes and the exemptions therefrom. After developing
the pre-Bishop case law, this Note will examine the administrative problems raised by
Bishop and its progeny. Finally, this Note will propose possible solutions to Ohio's
present administrative quagmire.
II. CONsTTioNAL IssuEs OF CHURCH PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
The United States Constitution is the ultimate authority for determining the
extent to which states may tax and exempt church property. The first amendment to
the Constitution prohibits the government from interfering with or promoting
religious beliefs: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' 1 6 However, "[t]he difficulty that
9. Oieo Ray. CODE ANN. § 5713.04 (Page 1980) (emphasis added).
10. Schnell, Real Property Tax Exemptions in Ohio-A Review and Critique, 17 CASE W. Ras. 824, 827 (1966).
11. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 442 N.E.2d 764 (1982).
12. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANm. §§ 5709.07-.121 (Page 1980).
13. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 53, 442 N.E.2d 764, 766 (1982).
14. Id. at 54, 442 N.E.2d at 766.
15. Id.
16. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I, § 1.
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has historically plagued courts in implementing these provisions stems in part from
the fact that their purpose 'was to state an objective, not to write a statute."' 1 7
State jurisdiction to tax property owners extends to all real property within the
limits of the state, 18 so long as "the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state."' 9 The United
States Supreme Court averred, in a statement covering the taxation of religious
institutions, that "[e]ach value judgment under the Religious Clauses must therefore
turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with
religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so."20 In other words, if a
state takes action through its tax system that affects real property belonging to a
religious institution, then the action must be justifiable under both clauses of the first
amendment. Thus, the constitutional limits on taxing or exempting real property
owned by churches must be delineated before examining Ohio's system of exemp-
tion.21
A. The First Amendment and Taxation
The constitutional limits upon the taxation of religious institutions have been
argued primarily in the context of income and social security taxation and their
interference with the free exercise clause. In United States v. Lee,22 an Amish farmer
employed several other Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop but then
"failed to file the quarterly social security tax returns required of employers, withhold
social security tax [sic] from his employees, or pay the employer's share of social
security taxes. "2 3 After paying $91.00 for the first quarter of 1973, he sued the federal
government for a refund, "claiming that imposition of the social security taxes violated
his First Amendment free exercise rights and those of his Amish employees.' 24
The District Court held the statutes requiring the payment of social security and
unemployment insurance taxes unconstitutional as applied to the Amish employer.25
However, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding the social
17. L. TRBE, AMCAN CONS1Tr'-NA. LAw 813 (1978) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
This dual set of prescriptions was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied to the states by the United
States Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
18. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905) ("It is... essential to the validity of [an
ad valorem property] tax that the property shall be within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing power.").
19. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
20. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
21. As noted in L. TN, A.muCAN CONSm-INAo LAw 815 (1978):
A pervasive difficulty in the constitutional jurisprudence of the religious clauses has accordingly been the
struggle "to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms,
and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."
Id. at 815 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
22. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
23. Id. at 254.
24. Id. at 255.
25. Lee v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 180, 184 (1980), rev'd., 455 U.S. 252 (1982). The Court noted that the
Amish believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and needy and therefore are religiously opposed to the national
social security system. However, this argument could just as easily be used to justify the Amish giving everything they
have to the social security system in order to best guarantee that their elderly will be provided for in the event of their own
deaths.
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security requirements to be constitutional. Although the Court noted that the
requirements violate Amish religious beliefs and that "compulsory participation in
the social security system interferes with their free exercise rights," '2 6 it concluded
that "[n]ot all burdens on religion are unconstitutional.' '27 The Court reached its
decision in poignant terms:
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise
Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every
aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which
are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an
employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. Congress
drew a line in § 1402(g), exempting the self-employed Amish but not all persons working
for an Amish employer. The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system
must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.28
Justice Stevens' concurrence aptly restated the rule that "the religious duty must
prevail unless the Government shows that enforcement of the civic duty 'is essential
to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.' "29 In this case, the Court found
such an interest.
In an earlier decision, Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 the Supreme Court delimited to
some degree the extent of governmental interests. The State of Wisconsin argued that
the children of members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative
Mennonite Church were required to go to public or private school beyond the eighth
grade. The Court established a test that
in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim
that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must
appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 31
After studying the importance of the law to the state, and balancing that interest with
its effects on the Amish community, the Court held that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their children
to attend formal high school to age 16.' 32
26. 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
27. Id. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
28. Id. at 261 (footnote omitted). The court added in the footnote a practical solution to the Amish debate:
We note that here the statute compels contributions to the system by way of taxes; it does not compel anyone
to accept benefits. Indeed, it would be possible for an Amish member, upon qualifying for social security
benefits, to receive and pass them along to an Amish fund having parallel objectives. It is not for us to speculate
whether this would ease or mitigate the perceived sin of participation.
Id. at n.12.
29. Id. at 261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. Id. at 214.
32. Id. at 234. "In the face of our consistent emphasis on the central values underlying the Religion Clause in our
constitutional scheme of government, we cannot accept a parens patriae .. such sweeping potential for broad and
unforeseeable application as that urged by the State." Id.
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Most recently, in a case involving arguments most similar to those present in
Bishop, the Supreme Court ruled in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary
of Labor33 upon whether the federal government's "imposition of the minimum wage
and recordkeeping requirements will violate the rights of associates [employees of the
Foundation] to freely exercise their religion and the right of the Foundation to be free
of excessive government entanglement in its affairs. "3 4 The Court ruled on these
claims under the two clauses of the first amendment separately.
First, the Court rejected the religious institution's free exercise claim under the
doctrine of United States v. Lee.35 The Supreme Court held "[i]t is virtually
self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a
governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually
burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights. ' 36 The Court noted that
because here the federal laws regulated wage earners competing in the open market,
"[w]e therefore fail to perceive how application of the Act would interfere with the
associates' right to freely exercise their religious beliefs." 37
Second, the Supreme Court employed similar arguments in rejecting the
establishment clause claims under the doctrine of Lemon v. Kurtzman.38 The religious
institution argued "that application of the Act's recordkeeping requirements would
have the 'primary effect' of inhibiting religious activity and would foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' 39 The Supreme Court re-
sponded that "[t]hese requirements apply only to commercial activities undertaken
with a 'business purpose,' and would therefore have no impact on petitioners' own
evangelical activities or on individuals engaged in volunteer work for other religious
organizations."4 Thus, application of the federal statutes to the religious institutions'
"commercial activities is fully consistent with the requirements of the First
Amendment,"41 and taxation of a religious institution is not a per se constitutional
violation.
B. The First Amendment and Exemption
An examination of the constitutional issues implicated in the exemption of
church-owned property begins with Walz v. Tax Commissioner.42 In Walz the United
States Supreme Court considered a taxpayer's claim that New York's statute granting
property tax exemptions to "houses of public worship" violated the establishment
33. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
34. Id. at 1963.
35. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
36. 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1963 (1985).
37. Id.
38. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 674 (1970)). See infra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text.
39. 105 S. Ct. 1953, 1964 (1985).
40. Id. (emphasis added). "The Establishment Clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular
governmental activity as fire inspections and building and zoning regulations, . . . and the recordkeeping requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while perhaps more burdensome in terms of paperwork, are not significantly more
intrusive into religious affairs." Id.
41. Id.
42. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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clause of the first amendment. 43 The Court indicated that it would find an
unconstitutional establishment of religion if "the end result-the effect--"44 of the
exemption was "an excessive entanglement with religion.'45
In rejecting the taxpayer's contention, the Court's reasoning was two-fold. On
the one hand, the Court held that the exemption of church-owned property did not
have the purpose or effect of establishing religion, because the New York exemption
system required only minimal church-state contact. 46 On the other hand, since the
exemption apparently created only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state, the Court noted that this minimal contact was far less than would
occur under a system of taxation of churches. 47 The Court concluded that the system
of exemption "restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to
complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other.''48
Thus, the Court ruled that the general practice of granting property tax exemptions to
churches does not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
The Walz opinion left unanswered a number of serious questions regarding the
taxation of church property. First, in holding that the exemption of church-owned
property did not cause excessive entanglement, the Court indicated that the taxation
of such property might result in excessive entanglement. 49 The Court noted that its
holding could not be read to require that states exempt all church-owned property,
because the contested exemption in New York, and those found in all of the fifty
states, applied only to "places of worship," and not to church-owned land used for
recreational or social purposes. 50 Demonstrating that limits exist upon the constitu-
tionality of exemption, the Court cited with approval to Gibbons v. District of
Columbia,51 an 1886 decision in which the Court upheld Congress's denial of a "tax
exemption as to land owned by but not used for the church.'"52 Mere ownership by
a church is not sufficient under the establishment and free exercise clauses to require
exemption for all church-owned property. Therefore, the Court's opinion can be read
to hold only that exemption or taxation of church-owned property is not per se
unconstitutional. 53
Second, the decision in Walz does not adequately resolve how to determine
when taxation or exemption of church property results in an unconstitutional
establishment of religion. In discussing this issue, the Court relied on two theories:
one, on the historical acceptance of property tax exemptions for houses of public
worship;54 and two, on the present circumstance that no establishment of religion has
43. Id. at 667.
44. Id. at 674.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 676.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
52. 397 U.S. 664, 679-80 (1970).
53. Id. at 678.
54. Id.
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resulted despite over two hundred years of exemption.55 However, the Court's
opinion left few guidelines for determining when a system of taxation or exemption
of church-owned property would be unconstitutional.
The foregoing analysis was the precursor of the three-prong test set forth by the
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman56 for determining when a law violates the establishment
clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 5 7 Today the Lemon test is determinative of the standards which must be
met in construing the constitutionality of exemption statutes.
Since Lemon,5 8 the Court has decided establishment clause cases on the basis of
this three-prong test. The Court has tended to gloss over the first two elements of the
test and to focus instead on the entanglement issue.5 9 However, in the area of
property tax exemptions, the Lemon test in its entirety is critical to an analysis of
Bishop and its progeny.
I1. THE FRAMEwORK OF REAL PROPERTY TAXATION AND EXEMP'rIoN
IN OHIo
A. The Foundations of Taxation
States have taxed their citizens to generate funds since our nation was founded. 60
The Ohio Constitution grants the General Assembly the power to "rais[e] revenue,
sufficient to defray the expenses of the state, for each year, and also a sufficient sum
to pay principal and interest as they become due on the state debt.' '61 Accordingly,
to raise revenue the Ohio Constitution provides that laws may be passed imposing
income, estate, excise, and franchise taxes. 62 In addition, the constitution also
provides for the taxation of real and personal property "according to value.''63
However, every law imposing a tax must "state, distinctly, the object of the same,
to which only, it shall be applied."64
In Ohio the income, estate, excise, and franchise taxes, along with property
taxes, have served to distribute the burden of financing the government throughout
55. Id. "Nothing in this national attitude toward religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom
from taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated
affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief." Id.
56. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
57. Id. at 612-13 (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 612.
59. Id. at 614.
60. Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 Mm. L. REv. 411, 411 (1934).
"Those economic activities of society that are carried on by the social group collectively, commonly known as
government functions, necessitate the diversion of a portion of the total income or wealth to government use." Id.
61. Omo Cos?. art. xII, § 4.
62. Otno Cosr. art. xII, § 3. See also Omo Cossr. art. xII, § 9.
63. Omo Cosr. art. XII, § 2. Article XII, section 2 also reads in pertinent part: "[G]eneral laws may be passed
to exempt burying grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusivelyforpublic worship, institutions used exclusively
for charitable purposes, and public property used exclusively for any public purpose." (emphasis added).
64. Omo Co.sr. art. XII, § 5.
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the state.65 The real property tax is the most pragmatically effective because it
involves the readily calculable figures of property acreage and land value. In fact, the
real property tax is "the bulwark of local taxation and an important source of state
revenue," accounting for over one-quarter of the state's collections.6 7
The "taxing authority" 68 of each subdivision within the state has the statutory,
power to levy taxes on all real property "within the subdivision for the purpose of
paying the current operating expenses of the subdivision and acquiring or construct-
ing permanent improvements. ' 69 Although the state of Ohio administers the annual
collection of real property taxes, it does not control the spending of this revenue. The
local taxing authority possesses the power to levy taxes and handle their distribu-
tion. 70 The revenue from real property taxes is distributed to the local taxing
authorities during the next calendar year. 71 Depending on the local educational and
governmental needs of the taxing districts, the millage72 paid by the taxpayers may
be adjusted locally. Since real property taxes are locally controlled, they are subject
to voter approval. 73
As a result, the administration of the real property tax in Ohio is awkwardly
bifurcated: on the local level the tax is administered by an elected assessor and
collector, the county auditor7 4 and treasurer75 respectively; on the state level the tax
is administered and supervised by a centralized agency, the Ohio Department of
Taxation. 76 The elected local representatives are under enormous political pressures
that may affect the degree to which they pursue their obligations. They are elected by
those whom they tax, and the more strictly they enforce the tax codes, the less likely
they are to be reelected. The state agency, on the other hand, is constitutionally
required to enforce the real property tax laws uniformly throughout Ohio, an
obligation that is in continual conflict with the strong local pressures.
65. Reitze, Real Property Tax Exemptions in Ohio-Fiscal Absurdity, 18 CAsE W. REs. 64 (1966).
66. Id. Real property in Ohio is broadly defined as follows:
[The] land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, all growing crops, including deciduous and
evergreen trees, plants, and shrubs, with all things contained therein, and, unless otherwise specified, all
buildings, structures, improvements, and fixtures of whatever kind on the land, and all rights and privileges
belonging or appertaining thereto.
Otto REv. CODE ANN. § 5701.02 (Page 1980).
67. ANNuA. REPORT, DEARTmEmr oF TAXATioN oF ume STATE oF Ouno (1984). In 1983, the state of Ohio assessed real
property taxes of over $3.3 billion, while the entire tax system generated slightly over $12.2 billion. Id.
68. Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.01 (C) (Page 1980).
69. Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 5705.03 (Page 1980); see also Owo REv. CoDE Am. § 5705.01 (C), 5705.05 (Page
1980).
70. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 5705 (Page 1980).
71. AmAi. REPoRT, DeARA'meNr OF TAxAnoN oF TmE STATE OF Oeo (1983).
72. Mill: "One-tenth of one cent. Many states use a mill rate to compute property taxes." BLAcK's LAw DIc'noxARY
896 (5th ed. 1979).
73. OHIo REv. CODE ANm. § 5705.25 (Page 1980).
74. Ouro REv. CODE ANN. §9 319.01, 5713.01 (Page 1980).
75. OHIo Rev. CoDE ANN. §§ 321.01, 323.08 (Page 1980).
76. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5703.01 (Page 1980).
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B. The Foundations of Exemption
1. Theoretical Foundations of Exemption
Every tax is limited in some degree to a particular portion of society. For
example, income taxes apply only to those who earn a taxable income and real
property taxes apply only to those who own land. In the same way that the income
tax is determined on the basis of the value in dollars of taxable income, the real
property tax is determined on the basis of the valuation of land. Depending upon the
actual method of taxation, certain groups in society can be viewed as carrying the
burden of government to the degree that other groups are not being taxed. 77 Thus, if
a government relies heavily upon real property taxation for revenue, then those in
society who own no property will be exempted indirectly from carrying the burden of
government.
Exemptions represent a more direct way of excluding specific groups of society
from carrying the burden of government. Governments commonly exempt property
used by governmental, charitable, educational, and religious institutions. When real
property is exempted from taxation, the parcels of land are removed from the tax lists
of the county auditors. 78 Accordingly, the owners of exempted parcels of property no
longer contribute revenue to government based on the value of the property they own.
As a result, the real property tax system becomes less uniform, since the burden of
government is being shifted from property owners who receive exemptions to those
who do not.
This shifting affects the system of taxation and exemption in two ways: the first,
mathematically, and the second, proportionally. The mathematical effect focuses
only upon the exemptions from real property taxation. "[A]ny reduction in the tax
base brings an immediate reduction in revenue," 79 however, every exempted parcel
of land that is placed back on the tax lists will increase mathematically the local
budget of the affected taxing district. Therefore, by placing exempt parcels back on
the tax lists, the budget can be increased without raising the tax millage.
The proportional effect focuses on the relationship between the exempted and
taxed parcels of real property. "[E]ach time a determination is made that a particular
parcel of property is exempt from taxation, the tax burden placed upon the [taxed]
property in the community is increased proportionately. "80 However, every exempt
parcel of land that is placed back on the tax lists proportionally either increases the
revenue available for the taxing district8 ' or decreases the tax burden on the property
owners.
82
77. Heisel, Exemption from Taxation of Property Used for Religious, Educational and Charitable Purposes in
Ohio, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 40 (1929).
78. Omo Ray. CoDE Ars. § 5713.01 (Page 1980).
79. Reitze, supra note 65, at 65.
80. Schnell, supra note 10, at 824.
81. If the millage remains unchanged, then the taxing district budget is increased proportionally to the amount of
exempt property returned to the tax lists.
82. If the budget remains unchanged, then the tax millage payable by the taxpayers is reduced in proportion to the
amount of property returned to the tax lists.
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The importance of these two effects of exemption from real property taxation
can be demonstrated through the use of the following simple tax formula: (Land
Acreage) X (Millage) = (Budget). Two hypotheticals best illustrate the application
of the formula. First, when the budget is fixed and the land acreage on the tax lists
decreases through exemption, the millage applicable to the remaining land must be
increased to maintain the budget. As a result, while each taxpayer's mathematical
payments are increased to make up for the real loss of taxable property, his
proportionate share of the fixed budget is also increased in relation to the amount of
property exempted. Thus, if the taxing authority, for instance the local school district,
is working under the strictures of a fixed budget, then the taxpayers with property
remaining on the tax lists must make up the loss both mathematically and
proportionally.
In a second hypothetical situation, when the millage is fixed and the acreage on
the tax lists is again decreasing through exemption, the budget will decrease. As a
result, while the budget is decreased mathematically as a direct consequence of the
loss of taxed land acreage, the proportionate share of governmental services are also
decreased in relation to the amount of property exempted. Thus, in either hypothetical
situation the consequences of exemption from real property taxes exhibit both
mathematical and proportional negative effects.
Despite the negative effects of real property tax exemption, the use of certain
exemptions can be justified by several highly promoted theories, each of which
seemingly builds upon the preceding theory while broadening the class of exemp-
tions. These theories include (1) the circularity theory, (2) the state's work theory, (3)
the humanitarian theory, and (4) the power politic theory.
The circularity theory acknowledges that because government owns and
administers certain property for the benefit of the public, that property ought to be
exempted from taxation. Accordingly, government property should not be taxed
because the general public profits from the use, and the tax "would merely result in
a return of public funds to the public." ' 83 A city taxing itself for the property
containing a public park or the mayor's office is ludicrous. In essence, the exemption
of public property is a simple solution to avoid the problem of a government taxing
itself for the property under its dominion.
But if exemptions can be justified for government property, exemption should
also be granted to nongovernment property that is being used for essentially the same
purpose. The state's work theory embodies the government's "desire to assist [and
promote] organizations doing the state's work. '"84 Under this theory, the government
"will gain if loss in revenue is exceeded by savings resulting from private
performance of functions that would otherwise be the state's responsibility." 85
Viewed strictly, state's work property should be exempted only for uses that are
identical to those performed by government. But under a less strict interpretation, the
83. Schnell, supra note 10, at 825.
84. Note, Exemption of Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Institutions from State Real Property Taxes, 64
HI- v. L. REv. 288, 288 (1950).
85. Id.
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theory also allows exemption when the government otherwise would be obligated to
expend energy in the same general area of exemption. Under the state's work theory,
a trade-off for exemption is calculated: the savings resulting from the performances
of the exempt function must outweigh the direct and immediate loss of revenue to the
government.8 6 Thus, although the government could tax these properties, the state's
work theory is a legitimate means of exempting real property, because lines can
readily be drawn distinguishing between governmental and nongovernmental
activities.
Additionally, states often promote activities that they do not perform; activities
which nonetheless are considered desirable to society because they "encourage
morals and education from political and social as well as from ethical motives." 87
The "more generous theory which has been imputed to the legislature is that the state
should encourage not only functions easing the state's burden, but all activities
devoted to humanitarian goals." 88 This third, or humanitarian, theory underlies the
majority of charitable and religious exemptions.
States are constitutionally barred from entering the field of religious instruction.
However, states do encourage these humanitarian endeavors by churches:
The influence of churches upon the character of various members of society is said to be
sufficiently desirable to warrant the removal of church property from the tax roll. Religious
societies devote their efforts and their property to the moral uplifting of society, in most
cases seeking no pecuniary profit for themselves.89
Thus, despite the strong relationships between moral and religious values, it is not
improper for states to promote high moral beliefs, for society views religious
institutions as but one of many sources that instill such values in our pluralistic
society. 9°
The justification of exemption under the humanitarian theory is far more
complex than under the first two theories. Circularity and state's work exemptions are
laid out in relation to governmental functions that can be identified on their face.
Many complex issues are raised in the field of exemptions, however, when
distinguishing between the humanitarian and the nonhumanitarian or less-humani-
tarian activities. Many taxpayers participate in activities that are in some way
beneficial to society, but that broad standard cannot be the sole criteria for exemption,
lest only a few parcels of land be left to carry the entire tax burden. Because the
justifications for humanitarian exemptions are difficult to distinguish, humanitarian
exemption statutes must be interpreted strictly in order to preserve their value. If a
judiciary interprets too broadly the language of such statutes, then the floodgates
might be opened to unintended exemptions and increased adjudication.
The fourth, or power politic, theory justifies real property tax exemptions on the
basis of the past use of the property, rather than upon the property's current or future
86. Heisel, supra note 77, at 57.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Note, supra note 84, at 288-89.
89. Stimson, supra note 60, at 422.
90. 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
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uses. The owners of such property have traditionally possessed the power to maintain
their exempt status by protecting it furiously. Powerful, political organizations have
greater motivation and tenacity in seeking exemption because their potential gain is
more apparent and immediate. 91 Exemption under the power politic theory has been
viewed as the consequence of historical political struggles. 92 Under any of the three
preceding theories, the power of the group seeking exemption is not a proper basis for
determining the exemption status of real property. The unprincipled notion that might
makes right cannot be supported by any state constitution or even the federal
constitution.
By stubbornly guarding the exemption status of their immediate property, these
exempted groups have withstood the elements of time. In turn, time becomes a
powerful ally to exemptions. Although most would agree that "exemptions should
not be granted merely because of custom or tradition," 93 the "long tradition of
exemptions acts to give them the legitimization of time. The special interests
benefited by the exemptions are not likely to renounce willingly their benefits, while
the public in general is not apt to be highly motivated to end the tax exemptions. '"94
Exemptions are legislatively enacted; they are, therefore, political creatures that are
revoked only grudgingly. Our political process prides itself on the creation of new
legislation, not on the rejection of old laws. Even when there is not a broad base of
support underlying exemptions, the political process has not eliminated them.
Politically, there is often no more irrefutable argument than "we've always done it
that way, so why change it?"
These four theories have led to the promotion of an exemption system that is
reviewed by the public only periodically. One commentator has stated: "The most
serious evil of tax exemptions is that a benefit is given by the public for which no quid
pro quo need be given.' 95 Under the circularity and the state's work theories, the
quality of the exempt uses is to a degree checked: regulated in part by the voting
process and in part by the demands of public funding. However, under the
humanitarian and the power politic theories, the quality of the exempt uses is not
subject to these checks. Once exempted, the humanitarian organization is responsible
only to itself, and the power politic organization historically commands its own
destiny. Thus, when an exemption has been granted for real property under the
humanitarian theory, the process leading to the recommendation must be scrupu-
lously adhered to by the deciding agencies.
91. Id. at 683.
92. Reitze, supra note 65, at 65.
Exemptions from property taxation are as venerable as the tax itself. This should not be surprising, for it is an
empirical fact that when a tax is created those affected will try to shift it to someone else. Eleventh and
twelfth-century ecclesiastical and military exemptions were an accepted part of the English tax system. Church
property was exempted, as it was no longer considered to be under human control when devoted to God.
Military exemption provisions performed what was considered a societal function, serving to encourage
protection of the community. Whether this reasoning convinced the populace is not known; however, the two
groups were the only ones with sufficient power to gain exemptions.
Id.
93. Stimson, supra note 60, at 422.
94. Reitze, supra note 65, at 84.
95. Id. at 83.
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2. The Foundations of Exemption in Ohio
In Ohio, all real property in the state is subject to taxation except that which is
expressly exempted. 96 Article XII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution grants the
legislature the power to enact exemptions from real property taxes for certain classes
of land described by their uses. 97 More specifically, the constitution provides that
church exemptions may be granted only for "houses used exclusively for public
worship."98
Amendments to the Ohio Constitution must be subject to a popular vote. 99 The
Ohio Constitution has been amended several times, Article XII, section 2 not
escaping modification. 100 Yet, the mechanical language describing church exemp-
tions as being limited to "houses used exclusively for public worship" has remained
constant as the electorate has affirmed each amendment to this section. Moreover, no
attempts to reduce the standard for church property exemption from "used exclu-
sively" to one of lesser use or only ownership, has succeeded. If the voters of Ohio
desire a change in the statutory requirements, they may express their desire in any
popular vote. They have not.
The Ohio General Assembly has exercised its authority under the Ohio
Constitution to enact statutes exempting certain classes of property from taxation. 01
Since the initial adoption of a church exemption statute, Ohio statutes have required,
consistent with the language of the Ohio Constitution, that property must be "used
exclusively for public worship" before an exemption can be granted. 10 2 And today,
the church exemption statute, as enacted and most recently amended, contains the
constitutional language requiring exclusive use; 0 3 for the statute to require less would
be a violation of the Ohio Constitution.t14
The Ohio Supreme Court, in 1922, discussed the limits upon both the legislative
96. Omo Rav. COD AsN. § 5709.01 (Page 1980). "Taxation is the rule and exemption the exception." Cleveland
Osteopathic Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio St. 222, 225, 91 N.E.2d 261, 262 (1950). For calendar year 1983 in Ohio,
$11.57 billion of real property or 13.05% of all land in the state, was exempt from taxation and separated from the tax
base. AsNwA REpoirr, DEAmmErr oF TAxxAno oF "im STATE O OHIO (1983).
97. Oino Co.ssr. art. XII, § 2. The constitution, however, in granting the General Assembly the power to enact
certain delimited exemptions, does so "without limiting the general power."
98. Otuo Coisr. art. XII, § 2.
99. Ow~o CosT. art. XVI, § 1. This section states in pertinent part: "If the majority of the electors voting on the
same [constitutional amendment] shall adopt such amendments the same shall become a part of the constitution ....
100. In 1905, an amendment to Article XI, section 2 exempting certain bonds from taxation was passed, then
repealed in part in 1912, and reamended to its current status in 1918. The 1918 amendment also included a clause granting
the legislature the power to pass laws protecting "against the double taxation that results from taxation of both the real
estate and the mortgage or the debt secured thereby, or other lien upon it." The Great Depression of 1929 provided the
impetus for motion toward passing the amendments to Article XII, section 2 in 1929 and 1933. The original mandatory
language of Article XII, section 2 stating that "laws shall be passed" was replaced in 1929 with passive language that
nonetheless granted to the legislature the power to enact certain real property tax exemptions. In addition, in 1933 a one
percent of value limit upon the taxation of property was substituted for the one and a half percent limit commenced in the
1929 amendment. See Oazo Cotss. art. XII, § 2 (as amended 1905, 1912, 1918, 1929 & 1933) (despite the extensive
history of amendment to this section of the Ohio Constitution, the exclusive use of language was never changed).
101. See, e.g., OtIo REv. CoD ANa. §§ 5709.07-.121 (Page 1980).
102. See infra note 133.
103. Otao REv. CODE AtN. § 5709.07 (Page 1980).
104. In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 72, 84 N.E.2d 270, 272 (1949).
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and the judicial branches when interpreting the constitutionality of exemption
statutes:
The legislature should exercise its authority to the fullest extent within the constitution to
encourage these worthy organizations in the accomplishment of their object, but it is not
within the court's power to extend exemptions beyond the authority granted by the
constitution or the acts of the legislature pursuant thereto.1o5
The Ohio Constitution and the Ohio church exemption statute have always limited the
exemption for church property to "houses used exclusively for public worship." The
judiciary must not interpret the exemption statute more broadly than the constitution
allows. If enough popular support for broadening the base of exemptions for religious
institutions exists, then the electorate will vote to amend the constitution. To date, the
electorate has rebuked all attempts to alter the "exclusive use" language found in the
constitution. 106
C. Ownership or Use Requirements as Elements of Exemption
An important distinction to note when interpreting real property exemption
statutes is that an exemption:
may be either in personam or in rem, the latter form being the more common. When tax
immunity is granted because of the peculiar status of the favored individual, it constitutes an
exemption in personam .... When tax exemption is granted to individuals or organizations
because their ... property is owned by individuals or organizations engaged in specified
activities, the exemption is in rem.' 07
In short, in personam describes an exemption based purely on ownership, while in
rem describes an exemption based either purely upon use, or upon use and ownership
in combination. If real property owned by a religious institution were exempted only
because it was owned by a church, the exemption would be in personam since it is
based upon ownership. If the same real property were required to be used in a certain
way (for example, "used exclusively for public worship"), the exemption would be
in rem since it is based upon use.
The case of National Headquarters D.A.V. v. Bowers08 exemplifies the
distinction between ownership and use in the interpretation of an exemption statute.
In Bowers, property was used by the Disabled American Veterans organization
("D.A.V.") to assemble and distribute small plastic replicas of motor vehicle
licenses that were sold to produce income for the organization. 0 9 The real property
exemption statute, which required that the property be used exclusively for charitable
purposes, was in rem. The Ohio Supreme Court conceded that the D.A.V. was
organized for charitable purposes, but found that the property in question was not
used exclusively for those purposes and therefore did not meet the test for exemption.
105. Wilson v. Licking Aerie, 104 Ohio St. 137, 148, 135 N.E. 545, 548 (1922).
106. See supra note 100.
107. Stinson, supra note 60, at 411.
108. 171 Ohio St. 312, 170 N.E.2d 731 (1960).
109. Id. at 313, 170 N.E.2d at 732.
[Vol. 47:535
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
The court held: "The use, not the ownership, is the test. It is the property, not the
institution, that is being taxed."' 10 Additionally, under the in rem theory, it is
irrelevant that the income generated from the use of the property is reinvested in the
charitable institution. "The law looks to the property, as it finds it in use, and not to
what is done with its accumulations." '
Although the terms of exemption statutes can vary considerably, Ohio currently
allows exemption only in rem." 2 The Ohio church exemption statute is in rem,
granting tax exemption not to property owned by religious organizations, but to
"houses used exclusively for public worship." Since humanitarian exemption
statutes are to be construed strictly," 3 the courts should require the actual use of the
property to be in complete conformity with the statutory requirement. Thus, the term
"exclusive use" must be construed as nearly as possible in accordance with the
intention of the legislature.
D. Exemption Viewed as a State Subsidy
An exemption from real property taxation means that the owner of exempt
property will not be contributing revenue to the government in proportion to the value
of the land. In fact, those who receive property tax exemptions from the government
are in turn being supported by the government and by the paying community. When
one portion of society must carry the burden of government, those who are not paying
are being subsidized by the government." 4 Exemption is not a direct subsidy; the
government is not funding the property owner in order to pay the property taxes.
Exemption is an indirect subsidy; the government simply does not collect that which
it is owed. Yet, the exempt property owner possesses the land and demands the same
government services (police, fire, zoning) as his neighbors, without contributing to
the funding of those services.
Normally, when government subsidizes an activity, budgets are drawn up,
requests are made, and the public is informed of how the community's money is
being spent. But because tax exemptions are an indirect subsidy, it is difficult to
determine precisely who is receiving the benefits, and what the cost of those benefits
is to society. When exempt property loses its cost effectiveness,' 1 5 the property
should be placed on the tax lists. Unfortunately, this probably will not happen.
Society has little opportunity to check up on the use of its tax exempt property.
Exemptions "do not appear in any budget, and, therefore, no democratic process
influences the exemption."" 6
Moreover, it is possible for the exemption subsidy to have no relation to its cost
or to the value that society places on the activity. For example, if a small private
110. Id. at 314, 170 N.E.2d at 733.
111. Cleveland Library Ass'n v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253, 258 (1880) (emphasis added).
112. Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 5709.07-.121 (Page 1980).
113. Reitze, supra note 65, at 76.
114. Id. at 83.
115. A use of real property loses its cost effectiveness when the value of the use that justified the exemption is less
than the revenue produced from taxation of that property.
116. Reitze, supra note 65, at 83.
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charity performs activities that could be subsidized by the government for $1000 a
year, on exempt property which, if taxed, would generate $2000 of tax revenue
yearly, the community would not support the activity. To be cost effective the amount
of the aid in all cases should depend upon "the actual needs of the favored institution
or the extent of its benefactions, rather than upon the value of the real property owned
or used."' 117 However, it is impracticable to perform cost effectiveness studies for
every plot of land that might be exempted. In Ohio, as long as the use of the property
qualifies for exemption under one of the statutes, exemption will be granted.
Exemption of church property is perhaps the most controversial of all the
possible indirect subsidies.
Attacks on the subsidization of religious institutions through tax exemptions have been
continuous. It is an anomaly that although no state can directly subsidize a church, these
indirect subsidies have been unassailable. . . .In the foreseeable future, then, the large
segment of the population not affiliated with any organized church can expect to continue to
be coerced into supporting organized religion by their organized brethren."1
Religious property exemptions are often criticized as a product of the power politic
theory.'19 Moreover, even if the indirect exemption subsidies were defined in the
government budget, "the large segment of the population not affiliated with any
organized church" could not legally withhold taxes to offset the subsidy. Only by
eliminating the subsidy from the budget would those who complain of subsidizing
"their organized brethren" be satisfied. But as one commentator states:
[U]nless there is first a loss of private political power it would be unrealistic to expect a
termination of an exemption privilege merely because a societal benefit commensurate with
the loss does not exist. Obviously, therefore, one of the obligation[s] of those living in a
democracy is the privilege of subsidizing the majority's activities.120
Because this "privilege" will apparently continue well into the future in Ohio, the
judiciary has a duty to interpret the statute as it is written and protect those in the
minority.
E. The Role of the DTE, the BTA, and the Ohio Supreme Court
The Division of Tax Equalization ("DTE")121 and the Board of Tax Appeals
("BTA") 2 are the executive appendages in charge of administering the real
property tax exemption statutes. All applications for exemption from real property
taxes must first be reviewed by the DTE.123 The chief executive officer of the DTE
is the Commissioner of Tax Equalization, who, under the authority of the tax
117. Stimson, supra note 60, at 423.
118. Reitze, supra note 65, at 72-73.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
120. Reitze, supra note 65, at 67.
121. Oxo Rsv. CODE ANN. § 5715.01 (Page 1980). The DTE was initially created as an independent administrative
department under House Bill No. 920 (eff. Oct. 11, 1976). Since 1983, however, the DTE has been a division of the
Department of Taxation under House Bill No. 260 (eff. Sept. 27, 1983).
122. Otuo REv. CODE ANN. § 5703.02 (Page 1980).
123. Omo Rav. CoDE ANN. § 5715.27 (Page 1980). The statute requires applicants to file with the tax commissioner
of the Department of Taxation, but since the DTE is a division of that department the DTE in fact reviews the application.
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commissioner, is charged with the supervision of local authorities in their duties
relating to the assessment of real property, and the levy and collection of taxes. 124
Among the Commissioner's responsibilities is that of approving or rejecting
applications for the exemption from real property taxes125 and of remitting illegally
assessed taxes and penalties. 126
The purpose of the application is to enable the DTE to determine whether the
actual use of the real property qualifies the owner for exemption under the Ohio
statutes. In the case of a religious institution, the church exemption statute requires
that the land contain a house "used exclusively for public worship." The DTE will
often contact the church or its attorney informally, or in certain circumstances
conduct a hearing.
Approximately 3000 applications were filed in 1984,127 up considerably from
the 2700 filed in 1983.128 The upward trend in applications shows no sign of
subsiding, nor will it subside as long as the judicial interpretation of the present laws
continues to waver. Every aspect of the system encourages application: the
applications and hearings are free; the attorney is often already salaried; and the
changing case law on exemption lacks any principled guidelines. Hence, applicants
denied exemption one year have every incentive to reapply the next year for
exemption under a different code section. 129
If an applicant is dissatisfied with the DTE recommendation-if the exemption
was denied or only a split listing was granted-the applicant has the right of appeal
to the BTA to review the DTE recommendation. The BTA at this point has full
powers to act as a review board and to grant an exemption based upon its factual
findings or statutory interpretation. Both the DTE and the BTA are required to record
their decisions. 130 Thus, a fair amount of legal research is generated to support their
written recommendations.
The process of determining whether property ought to be taken off of the tax lists
is, as mentioned, exhausting and time consuming. "The prolific litigation further
points to the rather unsatisfactory nature of most of the constitutional and statutory
language relating to the church exemption-language which due to its imprecision
and overly broad terminology, constitutes a veritable invitation to aggressive and
conscientious tax officers to resolve any doubts against exemptions."13, Yet, because
124. Ono REv. CODE AsN. § 5715.30 (Page 1980).
125. Onao Rev. CODE ANN. § 5715.01 (Page 1980).
126. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5715.39 (Page 1980).
127. JoUNAL or Tme DpE'AmEss or TAXA'nO., DVISoI or TAx EQ AU.ASON (1984).
128. JoURNA, or mE DFARTmENr OF TAxAaiox, DVSIoN OF TAx EQuo Z AnoN (1983).
129. There is no limit placed on the number of applications that may be made under different exemption code
sections. In addition, the administrative agencies differ in their interpretations of the laws with time. See, e.g., The
Columbus Dispatch, March 8, 1985, at 2B, col. 1 ("And when exemption cases were disputed 'the former Board of Tax
Appeals was more liberal than it is now,' said Carol Mahaffey, an attorney for the tax department's division of tax
equalization.").
130. Omo REv. CODE Ar. § 5717.03 (Page 1980).
131. Alstyne, Tax Exemptions of Church Property, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 461, 504 (1959). If the BTA rules against an
applicant, the applicant may appeal the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court or the appropriate county court of appeals.
Alternatively, the applicant may apply for a de novo hearing at the appropriate court of common pleas. Oino Rev. CODE
ANN. § 5717.04 (Page 1980).
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of the imprecise nature of the exemption statutes and their judicial interpretation,
religious institutions refuse to accept any recommendation short of a full exemption.
It is easy to equate the laudable goals of most churches with the statute's "public
worship" language. The ideals of the humanitarian theory underlie both. The
judiciary's interpretation must separate the humanitarian from the nonhumanitarian or
less-humanitarian purpose to determine exemption. This subjective state of the law
has led to the prolific litigation of exemption statutes.
One commentator has described the process that has resulted in the current state
of the exemption laws:
Legislative "buck-passing"-"Let's pass the bill even if we don't understand it, because the
courts will make clear what we meant"--is, of course, not uncommon; but in the tax
exemption field it may have a particularly vicious impact. Vagueness of exemption
language, coupled with the institutional dynamics of the assessor's position, tends, by
inviting litigation, to impose a practical tax discrimination upon those churches which are
most in need of financial assistance and least able to afford the costs, financial and
otherwise, of such litigation.132
This all translates into money spent to determine whether the state and, in the end,
local taxing districts, will lose revenue. Despite the built-in balances of appeals, one
must question whether this system nonetheless discriminates because it is too time
consuming, expensive, and arbitrary.
IV. THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OHIO'S CHURCH EXEMPTION STATUTE
A. The Era of Strict Construction
All versions of the church exemption statute have contained the exclusive use
requirement as derived from the Ohio Constitution. 133 Judicially, "Ohio has
traditionally construed its tax exemptions for churches very strictly," following the
legislated language. 134 The Ohio Supreme Court outlined the basis for this interpre-
tation as follows:
It is manifest, from the carefully worded language of these provisions, that the legislature
intended to place strict limitations upon exemptions, and great caution has been exercised in
the terms expressed, so that the tight of exemption conferred would not be abused or unduly
enlarged, and such restrictions are essential to a fair and equitable sharing in the burdens of
taxation.13S
Thus, "used exclusively" is judicially interpreted in accordance with its dictionary
meanings: "used purely" or "used for no other purpose."' 136
132. Id. at 505.
133. See, e.g., Oino REv. CODE AN. § 5709.07 (Page 1980); Oaio GEN. CODE § 5349; Onxo REV. STAarrEs § 2732;
Omo SwAN & SAYLOR STATu'ES § 761; Omo SwAN & Cerrcwtmml STATutEs § 1440.
134. Reitze, supra note 65, at 76.
135. Watterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 171, 82 N.E. 962, 966 (1907).
136. Id. at 174-78, 82 N.E. at 966-68.
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In 1874 the Ohio Supreme Court rendered in Gerke v. Purcell 137 its first decision
interpreting the boundaries of both Article XII, section 2 of the constitution and the
church exemption statute. The dispute hinged on the possible exemption of a
parsonage and the grounds surrounding the church building. 138 The court strictly
interpreted the constitutional language and held that the grounds surrounding any
church were exempt, but only to the extent that they were necessary for public
worship. 3 9 Regarding the parsonage, the court asserted that:
A parsonage, although built on ground which might otherwise be exempt as attached to the
church edifice, does not come within the exemption. The ground in such case is appropriated
to a new and different use. Instead of being used exclusively for public worship, it becomes
a place of private residence. The exemption is not of such houses as may be used for the
support of public worship, but of houses used exclusively as places of public worship.14
"[H]ouses used exclusively for public worship" included only the church edifice
itself and the property necessary for its proper use and enjoyment.
The 1907 case of Watterson v. Halliday'4' affirmed the Gerke holding. In an
attempt to fall outside the non-exempt parsonage classification, the church argued
that the residences of priests and bishops were used for the discharge of many duties
of both a religious and charitable nature, and that the parsonage therefore should be
exempted.' 42 This reasoning was rejected by the court, which thought it significant
that the legislature used the word "exclusively" throughout the exemption statute. 143
The court emphasized the distinction between use and mere ownership: "There
is no presumption of exemption from taxation because the institution claiming it is of
a religious or charitable nature, for it is perfectly competent for such institutions to
own property clearly subject to taxation."' 4 4 Even though the parsonages were being
used only in connection with church activities, they were considered to be primarily
residences, and thus not "houses used exclusively for public worship."' 45 To qualify
for exemption, the property had to be used in a manner consistent with the language
of the exemption statute.
The strict interpretation of the church exemption statute remained fairly constant
for forty more years. As late as 1941, in Congregational Union v. Zangerle,146 the
Ohio Supreme Court held that a parking lot did not qualify for an exemption since it
was not necessary for the proper use and enjoyment of a church building. 147 The only
137. 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
138. Id. at 247.
139. Id. at 248.
140. Id. at 230.
141. 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E. 962 (1907).
142. Id. at 152-59. Note: the argument for the plaintiff is not printed in the regional reporter.
143. Id. at 167-73, 82 N.E. at 965-66.
144. Id. at 170, 82 N.E. at 965.
145. Id. at 180, 82 N.E. at 968.
146. 138 Ohio St. 246, 34 N.E.2d 201 (1941).
147. Id. at 247, 34 N.E.2d at 202. The facts relied upon by the court were somewhat unusual. The grounds not
exempted contained a parking lot. However, the property had a separate parcel number from the exempted property and
was purchased by the church six years after the church lot had been obtained. The parking lot was contiguous to the church
structure. In reaching its decision, the court held the use of the nonexempt lot was not necessary for the proper use and
occupancy of the church under the church exemption statute.
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entity that qualified for exemption was that which the statute clearly contemplated: a
church building and the green space necessary for its existence.
In 1948, however, the Ohio Supreme Court portended its adoption of an
ever-expanding view of the church exemption statute. In Mussio v. Glander148 the
court faced the contemporary problem of the multipurpose church building. In the
past, when a church sought exemption for a single lot that contained both exempt and
nonexempt portions, such as a church and a parsonage, the property was split into
separate entities by a sale through a strawman. Through this process, the portion of
the property containing the house "used exclusively for public worship" maintained
its exclusive status. Consequently, it was eligible for exemption. The separate lot,
which contained the parsonage, remained on the tax lists. The system was arguably
inefficient, but the integrity of the exemption system remained intact.
Multipurpose buildings, however, unlike separate buildings on a lot, could not
be split by floor level through a strawman sale. Although frustrated with the result,
the Mussio court affirmed the judicial course by holding that the tax exemption statute
was to be strictly read. However, anticipating the passage of a statute that would
virtually eliminate the need for strawman sales, the court remarked: "Taxing
authorities are not authorized to split the listing of a separate parcel of real property
owned by a single charitable institution so as to tax a portion and exempt the rest of
the property from taxation." 1 49
B. Bond Hill and the Primary Use Test
In the term following the Mussio decision, the Ohio Supreme Court abandoned
its strict construction of the "used exclusively" language contained in the church
exemption statute. In In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew SchoolSO the court
interpreted "exclusive" to mean "primary,"' 5' thereby creating the primary use
doctrine.' 5 2 The church in Bond Hill sought exemption for a one and a half story
multipurpose building,153 the first floor of which was admittedly used exclusively for
public worship.' 54 A man who acted as caretaker for the building was permitted to
live with his family rent-free in the rooms above the church. The court held that as
long as the primary use of the building was for public worship, then the entire
building could be exempted under the church exemption statute.155 The Bond Hill
court viewed the building as a single unit and asked whether, on the whole, the
148. 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233 (1948).
149. Id. at 425, 79 N.E.2d at 234.
150. 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
151. Id. at 75, 84 N.E.2d at 273.
152. See supra note 6.
153. Multipurpose buildings are at the heart of the problem regarding real property tax exemptions for churches.
They typically contain many rooms, each of which has numerous uses, ranging from church administration and religious
ceremony to bingo fund raising and caretaker habitation. Because most churches suffer from financial shortages, most of
these buildings were not developed through legal planning-they are being used merely for what the church members at
that time feel is important for their parish.
154. 151 Ohio St. 70, 71, 84 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1949).
155. Id. at 77, 84 N.E.2d at 274.
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structure was primarily used as a house of public worship.' 56 The residential use,
consequently, could be viewed as "incidental" to the overall use and purpose of the
building. 15 7 "In the instant case, the primary use of the building is for public
worship. It is not reasonable to say that because the caretaker and his wife and child
lived in a relatively small portion, the building was not a house which was used
exclusively for public worship."'' 5
The court saw the primary use test as a solution for complex exemption
situations:
Such a literal construction [of "exclusive use"] could prevent any exemption being given
under these words of the Constitution [Article XII, section 2]. It would not be difficult to
show some slight use of any church building for a purpose other than public worship. It
would probably be impossible to prevent such use. The building must be open to all
members of the public if it is to qualify as one used for "public worship." If someone comes
into the building and misuses it, is the exemption to be denied? Such a literal construction
would clearly not be a reasonable construction. The people certainly intended that the words
they used in the Constitution should be given a reasonable meaning.159
Thus, the primary use test replaced the court's strict interpretation of the "exclusively
used" requirement.
Ohio courts today generally agree that the primary use test is a valuable judicial
tool, one that aids them in achieving justice. 60 But in the exemption field, the
adoption of the primary use test is troublesome. First, the test is little more than a
case-by-case problem solver that places numerous legislative functions in the hands
of the judiciary. In Bond Hill, for instance, the court prefaced its conclusion with the
phrase, "In the instant case," 16 1 which can only suggest to other potential applicants
that they too will qualify as an exception to the rule. Second, the test is to some
degree a fiction. Despite the court's plethora of verbiage, there is in reality no
difference between the use of part of a building as a caretaker's quarters and the use
of a separate building as a parsonage. Both uses are residential. Last, the test requires
the judiciary to perform several legislative functions. Not one word in the exemption
statute interpreted by the court had been changed since it was enacted. The court took
it upon itself to replace "exclusively" with "primarily" when looking at the building
as a whole. Although the resulting primary use test is based upon sound logic and has
simplified certain exemption decisions, the test as espoused in Bond Hill has allowed
the courts to legislate their own standards, on a case-by-case basis, as to when
property is eligible for exemption. These problems have only been exacerbated by the
court's interpretations of the Split statute as it applies to the church exemption statute.
156. Id. at 76-77, 84 N.E.2d at 274.
157. Id. at 77, 84 N.E.2d at 274.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 72, 84 N.E.2d at 272. The court later noted: "Although constitutional provisions for exemption from
taxation should be given a strict construction, that construction should be reasonable and one which will not defeat the
intention which the people expressed by the words which they used." Id. at 73, 84 N.E.2d at 272.
160. See, e.g., Moraine Heights Baptist Church v. Kinney, 12 Ohio St. 3d 134, 135-36, 465 N.E.2d 1281, 1282
(1984).
161. 151 Ohio St. 70, 77, 84 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1949). No evidence exists showing that the statute was enacted as
a reaction to the Bond Hill decision.
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C. The Split Statute and the Church Exemption Statute
Only months after the Ohio Supreme Court decided Bond Hill, the Ohio General
Assembly amended General Code section 5560, now Ohio Revised Code section
5713.04, to include a clause described as the split statute. 62 The split statute provides
exemption for portions of improved or unimproved property when the applicant
adequately demonstrates the following: first, that the entire property is under single
ownership; second, that the portion of the property to be exempted qualifies as a
separate entity; and third, that the separate entity is used exclusively for exempt
purposes. The split statute does not look at the building as a single unit and decide
whether the whole building qualifies for exemption. Rather, it looks at the building
room by room to determine whether any room qualifies for exemption. When a split
exemption is granted for a portion of property, the property used for nonexempt
purposes will be listed separately and taxed accordingly. 163 A split listing can be
applied vertically, horizontally, or otherwise,'14 and any exempt portion of a building
or property, for example a church service room, will be separated and taken off of the
tax lists. Unfortunately, the split statute has caused as many legal dilemmas as it was
intended to resolve.
Until 1982 the split statute and the church exemption statute each possessed
independent histories of judicial interpretation. Despite the exclusive use language
found in both the split statute and the church exemption statute, the latter was read
to require only primary use while the former was held strictly to its wording. 165
Because the split statute was enacted after the Bond Hill decision, albeit by only a
matter of months, the primary use test was not applied to the split statute in that
case-indeed, it can be argued that the court would not have created the primary use
test at all if the enactment of the split statute had preceded Bond Hill.
The split statute can be used in either a positive or a negative manner.166 To use
the split statute positively, the courts can carve out an exempt "entity" that otherwise
would remain taxed because the whole parcel of property is not used for an exempt
purpose. Using the statute negatively, the courts can retain the nonexempt portions of
property that otherwise would have escaped taxation under the primary use test on the
tax lists because their nonexempt qualities are not great enough to disqualify the
whole parcel of property. In either case, the split statute provides a more accurate
assessment of the exempt and nonexempt uses of the property.
162. See supra note 2. The split statute requires the entity separated to be "used exclusively for an exempt
purpose." According to Goldman v. The L.H. Harrision, 158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E.2d 530(1952), the separation cannot
be based on either time or area-ratio percentages. If a certain area within a multipurpose building is used 80% of the time
as a church or charity, it does not qualify for exemption under the statute. Or, even if four-fifths of the building can be
described as "used exclusively for public worship," the division is not determined by percentage. Rather the exempt
four-fifths of the building must be separated out and recorded as exempt, while the final fifth is subject to taxation.
163. Oto REv. CODE ANN. § 5713.04 (Page 1980).
164. Schnell, supra note 10, at 827.
165. Bishop v Kinney, 2 Ohio St. 52, 53, 442 N.E.2d 764, 765 (1982).
166. The strategy for exemption from the applicant's perspective is to claim exemption under the statutes as follows:
when only a small portion of the property is used for exempt purposes (for example, as a church), claim that the portion
used exclusively for an exempt purpose qualifies under the split statute; but when only a small portion of the property is
used for nonexempt purposes (for example, leased for a business), claim that the whole property is primarily used for an
exempt purpose under an exemption statute.
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The statute, additionally, resolves previously unanswerable questions regarding
exemption for multipurpose buildings. 167 The split statute was designed as a quick
solution to the situations in which a strawman sale under the church exemption statute
alone was infeasible.168 Previously, the property was exempt only if the entire
multipurpose church building was used primarily as a house of public worship.
Although the primary use as a house of public worship might not be diminished by
the use of the second floor as a caretaker residence, 69 it would be destroyed by the
use of the second floor as a preacher's residence (parsonage); 70 then none of the
property containing the church would be exempted. To prevent such divergent results
for multipurpose buildings, courts today can use the split statute to retain nonexempt
portions of property on the tax lists while freeing exempt portions from the tax lists.
The price, however, for such accuracy is high, because exemption under the
split statute is overly complex. Although the state hearing boards might occasionally
save time in separating out the exempt portions of property from the nonexempt, the
county auditors are required to spend a great deal of extra time relining the property
records to match up with the split listings. In addition, a great deal of time will be
spent recording the justifications of split listings because the hearing boards must
record all denials of exemption. The system is not as efficient with the split statute,
and the lack of efficiency costs the taxpayers more money.
In an ideal universe, the split statute does make sense. It is fair to exempt a
church entity located on one level of a large multipurpose building when the church
is no different from other exempted churches. A multipurpose building containing a
church should not be in an inferior position because it did not happen to develop with
separate and unique structures for church and parsonage. That notion of fairness
underlays the legislative enactment. The Ohio legislature, however, did not anticipate
the judicial quagmire that resulted. The churches realized a new weapon they could
wield in order to gain exemption for every room remaining on the tax lists. They are
now waging a war of attrition against the state that set up the system in the first place.
V. BISHOP v. KNNEY AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS
A. Bishop v. Kinney
1. The Primary Use Test Applied to the Split Statute
In Bishop v. Kinney, the Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Cleveland
sought exemption from real property taxes for the land containing a three level
multipurpose building divided roughly into the church, the parsonage, and the parish
hail.17 1 The Board of Tax Appeals denied exemption for the parish hall, and the
Roman Catholic Diocese appealed the decision, taking its case to the Ohio Supreme
167. See supra notes 153-54.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
169. Watterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E. 962 (1907).
170. In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
171. Bishop v. Kinney, 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 52, 442 N.E.2d 764, 764 (1982).
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Court. 172 The court held that because the primary use of the parish hall was "religious
in nature," and the Tax Commissioner had conceded "such use constitutes 'public
worship' within the meaning of [the church exemption statute] .... [the] appellant is
entitled to a tax exemption for the parish hall" under the split statute. 173
The facts of Bishop clearly reveal the dilemmas facing both the courts and the
administrative agencies today. The many facets of the split statute had to be applied
in the context of a multipurpose building serving many uses. The church level of the
multipurpose building was exempted as a separate entity, and the parsonage level
denied, exhibiting the positive and negative manners in which the split statute can be
used. 174 The Roman Catholic Diocese argued that the remaining portion of the
multipurpose building, the parish hall, was also used primarily for religious
purposes. 175 The parish hall in the multipurpose building was itself a multipurpose
room:
176
The parish hall is a large room with movable partitions which can be used to create four
classrooms. Two days per week, religion classes are held in the hall. Faculty training
programs and curriculum workshops for the parish school of religion are also held in the
hall. The hall is also used for retreats, summer bible school and engagement encounters.
Two Sundays per month, breakfasts are held in the hall after Mass. Church groups, girl scout
groups and other civic organizations hold their meetings in the hall. One night per week,
bingo games are conducted in the hall.177
These buildings with multiple uses and the rooms within them have become
commonplace for parishes conserving their resources.
The question faced by the court was whether the portion of the church
multipurpose building described in Bishop qualified under the split statute as a
separate entity being used exclusively as a house of public worship. In reaching its
decision the Ohio Supreme Court held that it could find no authority "which would
support appellee's contention that the enactment of the split-listing statute diminished
the viability of the primary use test enunciated in Bond Hill," and thereby applied the
primary use doctrine to the split statute. 178
The court, however, limited the scope of the questions it was answering. The
court held that three requirements had to be met before the parish hall could be
exempted under the split statute. 179 First, the church had to establish that the portion
of the multipurpose building used as the parish hall was indeed "a separate entity"
from the rest of the building. The court agreed that the self-contained hall was a
172. Id.
173. Id. at 54, 442 N.E.2d at 766. It is unclear why the court substituted the "religious in nature" use test for the
traditional "public worship" test. See supra text accompanying note 15.
174. The positive use of the split statute was the exemption of a portion of property containing the church level from
otherwise nonexempt property. The negative use of the split statute was the splitting off of the nonexempt parsonage level
from what otherwise might have been exempt property used for a church. The reason that this is negative is that under
the primary use doctrine the split parsonage might have been exempted along with the church. See supra notes 150-61
and accompanying text.
175. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 52, 442 N.E.2d 764, 764 (1982).
176. See supra note 153.
177. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 52, 442 N.E.2d 764, 764 (1982).
178. Id. at 53, 442 N.E.2d at 765.
179. Id. at 52-53, 442 N.E.2d at 765.
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separate entity.' 80 Second, the court had to find that the multipurpose building
containing the parish hall was under single ownership. This was uncontested.' 8' Last,
the court had to decide whether the parish hall was being "used exclusively for
exempt purposes" according to the split statute requirements.
The Tax Commissioner took a defensive position regarding the requirement that
in order to be exempted the entity must be used exclusively for some exempt purpose.
Rather than arguing that the parish hall level was not used "exclusively" for public
worship, or even that it was not used "primarily" for public worship, the
Commissioner accepted that the use of the parish hall level was "religious in nature,"
and argued that the primary use doctrine articulated in Bond Hill was not applicable
since it was decided before the split statute was enacted.'
82
The Bishop court, however, construed the exclusive use language found in both
the split statute and the church exemption statute as requiring a parallel interpreta-
tion.' 83 The court then agreed with the BTA that the primary use was "religious in
nature" and, incredibly, asserted that such use qualified for exemption under the split
statute. Consequently, the court held that the exclusive use language contained in the
split statute required that a portion of a building be exempted when primarily used for
public worship. 184 In support of its holding that "religious in nature" satisfies the
exclusive use requirements of the statutes, the court supported its reasoning with a list
of cases possessing parallel fact situations, where "rooms similar to the parish hall
have been granted exempt status."'185
The Ohio Supreme Court referred to a passage in Bond Hill that discussed the
problems arising under the strict construction of exclusive use language.' 86 The
Bishop court then asserted: "We find this rationale equally applicable whether the
focus of inquiry is the whole building, as in Bond Hill, or a portion thereof as now
authorized by the split-listing statute." 87 The split and church exemption statutes are
more analogous to an apple and an orange than to a matched pair. To employ the split
statute is first to determine whether an exempted use exists (for example, for "houses
used exclusively for public worship") and then to apply that use to the exclusive use
language within the split statute. These are two different statutory jobs, and the fact
that both statutes have similar language is irrelevant. Accordingly, several problems
were created by the Bishop interpretation.
180. Id. at 52, 442 N.E.2d at 764 ("The parish hall is a large room with movable partitions which can be used to
create four classrooms."). The issue of what is a separate entity has plagued the courts since the inception of the split
statute. See, e.g., New Haven Church v. BTA, 9 Ohio St. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 366 (1967).
181. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 52, 442 N.E.2d 764, 765 (1982) ("Appellant, the Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese
of Cleveland, Trustee for St. Patrick Church in Wellington, Ohio . . .
182. Id. at 54, 442 N.E.2d at 766.
183. Id. at 53, 442 N.E.2d at 765 ("We find this rationale equally applicable whether the focus of inquiry is the
whole building, as in Bond Hill, or a portion thereof as now authorized by the split-listing statute.").
184. Id. at 54, 442 N.E.2d at 766.
185. Id. See Operation Evangelize v. Kinney, 69 Ohio St. 2d 346, 432 N.E.2d 200 (1982); Episcopal Parish v.
Kinney, 58 Ohio St. 2d 199, 389 N.E.2d 847 (1979); New Haven Church of Missionary Baptist v. Board of Tax Appeals,
9 Ohio St. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 366 (1967); Trustees of the Church of God v. Board of Tax Appeals, 159 Ohio St. 517,
112 N.E.2d 633 (1953).
186. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 53, 442 N.E.2d 764, 765 (1982).
187. Id.
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2. The Creation of a New Standard Defining Public Worship: "Religious in Nature"
The judiciary, performing its duty in applying statutes to specific factual
situations, must interpret the component statutory language within a certain spectrum
of reasonableness.18 8 In Bishop, however, the Ohio Supreme Court did not stop its
expansive interpretation of real property tax exemptions with the primary use test; it
promoted a new, broader standard of public worship for exemption. The court held
that public worship which is "religious in nature" satisfies the requirements of the
church exemption statute, which exempts only "houses used exclusively for public
worship.' 1 89 Apparently, through the court's parallel interpretation under the
primary use doctrine of the requirements for both the church exemption and split
statutes, a separate entity within a parcel of property need only be used in a manner
that is religious in nature to qualify for exemption. Exempt uses are no longer limited
to whole tracts of property under the church exemption statute, but are extended
through the split statute to include any "separate entity" within any building-be it
a church edifice, retreat lodge, television office, or radio station-so long as that
separate entity is used for purposes that are merely religious in nature.
If "religious in nature" is to be the new standard of public worship under the
church exemption statute, then the courts will be forced to rule regarding similar
situations. In Watterson v. Halliday, for example, the priests conducted numerous
religious functions in the parsonage, services that often take place in the church.19o
These services can be described as no less religious in nature than the uses of the
parish hall in Bishop. Indeed, the record notes that no services were conducted in the
parish hall that could have been held in the church as public worship. 191 The court's
distinction between the degree of the religious use is that the parish hall is exempt and
the parsonage is not; in effect, the court is legislating what ought and ought not to be
exempt.
Additionally, the court in Bishop alters judicial techniques by placing the burden
upon the hearing boards and the BTA to demonstrate that "the building or rooms in
question [are] primarily used for a non-exempt purpose."' 9 2 In effect, the court not
only lowered the standards necessary to qualify for exemption, but it also imposed the
burden of persuasion on administrative hearing boards.
The Bishop decision has greatly altered the interpretation of Ohio's church
exemption statute. Presently it appears that all that must be shown for exemption of
a room in a parish hall is that the room is used primarily in a manner that is "religious
in nature." This is a far cry from the supreme court's use of strict construction 100
188. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979) (Neither the language of the statute nor
its legislative history discloses any affirmative intention by Congress that church-operated schools be within the NLRB's
jurisdiction, and, absent a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers of church-operated schools within the
NLRB's jurisdiction, the Court will not construe the Act in such a way as would call for the resolution of difficult and
sensitive first amendment questions.).
189. Bishop v. Kinney, 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 54, 442 N.E.2d 764, 766 (1982).
190. 77 Ohio St. 150, 162-67, 82 N.E. 962, 963-65 (1907).
191. 2 Ohio St. 3d 52, 52, 442 N.E.2d 764, 764 (1982).
192. Id. at 53, 442 N.E.2d at 765-66.
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years ago while interpreting the same Ohio Constitution.1 93 If this is really the test,
then one must ask why parsonages located in separate buildings have not been
exempted. A parsonage like the one described in Watterson is no less "religious in
nature" than the parish hall in Bishop. There are no logical distinctions. Thus,
Bishop's repercussions leave the courts with no coherent analysis.
B. The Progeny of Bishop v. Kinney
Since its decision in Bishop, the Ohio Supreme Court has continued on a course
of ambivalence toward real property exemptions for religious institutions. The
progeny of Bishop, Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney' 94 and Moraine
Heights Baptist Church v. Kinney, 195 exemplify the judicial predicament that has
arisen. In both decisions, the court seemingly upheld the "religious in nature"
standard first promoted in Bishop, while denying both churches exemption for their
respective properties, a day care center and a forty-nine acre camp. Yet, what is most
important about these decisions is the obvious conflict between the state and the
religious institutions.
In Summit, the religious institution sought exemption under the church exemp-
tion statute for a parish center (multipurpose building) comprised of a sanctuary and
an educational wing with rooms on three floors. Summit's exemption request was
denied by the DTE and the BTA, leading Summit to appeal to the Ohio Supreme
Court. 196 The BTA, perhaps reflecting on its failed tactics in Bishop, argued that the
primary use of the rooms was not religious in nature. The court agreed:
The educational wing is used on Sundays by the Appellant for Sunday school classes, but
during the week the facilities are leased and used by the Ohio State University, which
operates a day care center for children of its faculty, staff and students. The University had
a five-year lease on the property and paid rent of $9,309 in 1978, plus utilities on the
property. The day care center is under the control of Ohio State University and it charges a
sliding scale fee to those familities [sic] and personnel that use it.197
Exemption was denied under the church exemption statute.
However, what is crucial to note is that two years earlier the Summit church had
attempted to gain exempt status for the same property, but under the charitable use
statute. 198 The supreme court held that a church cannot be a charity, and denied
exemption for the day care center. 199 Summit Church, undaunted, reapplied under the
church exemption statute claiming that the property was really used as a church,2 00
and waged another year-long battle with the forces of taxation.
Summit might have perceived that using the day care center for Sunday school
193. Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
194. 7 Ohio St. 3d 13, 455 N.E.2d 669 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Summit 11).
195. 12 Ohio St. 3d 134, 465 N.E.2d 1281 (1984).
196. Summit II, 7 Ohio St. 3d 13, 14, 455 N.E.2d 669, 670 (1983).
197. Id.
198. Summit United Methodist Church v. Kinney, 2 Ohio St. 3d 72, 442 N.E.2d 1298 (1982) (hereinafter cited as
Summit I).
199. Id. at 73, 442 N.E.2d at 1298 (1982).
200. Summit II, 7 Ohio St. 3d 13, 14, 455 N.E.2d 669, 670 (1982).
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classes would satisfy the more lenient religious in nature test. After all, one could
argue that the religious instruction classes taught in the day care center of a church
are religious in nature. Yet, one must always return to the statute for guidance, and
the statute reads "houses used exclusively for public worship." Perhaps Summit
hoped that it could receive a split exemption for the Sunday school classrooms.
However, the court refused to follow this logic, and bound itself by the BTA holding
that the day care center as a whole was not religious in nature. 20 ' The church,
confused and probably bitter, believes that it performs meritorious functions for
society and does not understand why its property was denied exemption: it only wants
to know how to obtain exempt status for its land.
In Moraine Heights, the religious institution sought exemption for a forty-nine
acre camp that contained a tabernacle and numerous outdoor facilities. 20 2 Moraine
Heights first applied under the church exemption statute. The court agreed with the
BTA decision exempting only the land containing the tabernacle, holding that the
other forty-nine acres "are, at best, merely supportive of appellant's goal to promote
worship. "203 The court denied Moraine Heights Church the right to an appeal on the
charitable exemption statute along with the church exemption statute, 20 4 leaving that
cause of action open for future litigation that the church will more than likely pursue.
In both Summit and Moraine Heights, however, the glaring uncertainty of whether the
court might happen to grant exemption is evident, and both churches obviously felt
that it was worth a spin at the roulette wheel to gain exemption.
VI. PROPOSALS
On January 20, 1985, Oral Roberts discussed church property exemptions on his
Sunday morning television revival. Mr. Roberts declared that "they" want to take
away "our exemptions" by the turn of the century. He continued, saying that any
such action would pit "Christians against non-Christians in America." Before asking
for support, Mr. Roberts expressed his belief that the ensuing conflict would be "a
trial for all of us." 20 5
There is little doubt that the various religions feel threatened by any type of
statutory reform. Perhaps they reason that if the laws are subject to change, at some
point they may be changed against them. Yet, as churches push the exemptions to
their financial limits, revision will become inevitable. For the present, however, the
unsettled condition of the exemption statutes is creating an administrative quagmire
for the state of Ohio.
The system of tax exemptions in Ohio must be revised, for the statutes are too
subjective in nature. To judge property purely by its use rather than by ownership
adds an infinite number of variables to what ought to be a simple determination:
whether or not to exempt real property from taxation. The problems that have resulted
201. Id. at 15, 455 N.E.2d at 671.
202. 12 Ohio St. 3d 134, 136, 465 N.E.2d 1281, 1282-83 (1984).
203. Id. at 136, 465 N.E.2d at 1283.
204. Id.
205. Oral Roberts Television Program, CBS Television (January 20, 1985).
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are two-fold. On the one side, there are the applicant taxpayers who will aggressively
pursue any potential opportunity to reduce their own tax liability. On the other side
are the aggressive government agents who must enforce the oblique conceptions of
exclusive use to the best of their ability. In effect, the state of Ohio is holding a
nebulous carrot before the attentive eyes of the religious institutions, resulting in
numerous conflicts.
The inevitable clash of the two forces on either side of the tax exemption debate
can be avoided, however, by making the present church exemption statutes more
objective. A simple, more in personam 20 6 system would well serve the state.20 7 Any
qualified, not-for-profit religious institution managing property containing a church
building could receive exemption for the property up to a set measure of acreage.
20 8
Under this system, the religious institutions can use the property as they choose. 209
The semantic debates involved in distinguishing between concepts such as caretaker
residences and parsonages would be eliminated, as would the incessant church
lobbying for multiple-use exemptions: if the multipurpose building is on the acreage
containing the church building and is not used commercially, 210 it will be exempt
from real property taxation.
However, if the system cannot be revised, then the language of the church
exemption statute, as derived verbatim from the Ohio Constitution, must be adhered
to by the supreme court. No amendment to either has everaltered the exclusive use
requirement, and no reasonable interpretation of either's exclusive use requirement
should equate that standard of public worship with "religious in nature."211 In
addition, the language of the split statute must be interpreted strictly when employed
in conjunction with the church exemption statute and in granting exemption only for
entities "used exclusively for exempt purposes." To allow a looser interpretation of
either is to increase exponentially demands for partial exemptions. Presently,
fractional acreage measurements holding church buildings on immense parcels of
property are being exempted through the split statute, churches with measurements
206. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Ky. Coss., § 170. The constitution reads in pertinent part:
There shall be exempt from taxation . ..places actually used for religious worship, with the grounds attached
thereto and used and appurtenant to the house of worship, not exceeding one-half acre in cities or towns, and
not exceeding two acres in the country; . . . all parsonages or residences owned by any religious
society, . . .and occupied as a home, and for no other purpose, by the minister of any religion, with not
exceeding one-half acre of ground in towns and cities and two acres of ground in the country appurtenant
thereto; . .. land] all laws exempting or omitting property from taxation other than the property above
mentioned shall be void.
208. In Kentucky, the set measure is either one-half or two acres. Ky. Cosr., § 170.
209. The exemption granted by the Kentucky constitution on its face contains exclusive use language. Ky. CossT.,
§ 170 ("places actually used for religious worship"). However, the ambiguity of that language is nullified by the acreage
limits also established in the constitution-limits not present in the Ohio Constitution. Because of these limits, the
religious institution must show only that the one-half or two acres of land contain a church in order to obtain the
exemption.
210. Broadway Christian Church v. Commonwealth, 112 Ky. 448, 66 S.W. 32 (1902) (a church parsonage that is
not occupied by the minister but is rented to another, is not exempt from real property taxes, though erected on the church
lot, and though the rent is paid to the minister).
211. This line of judicial reasoning has been followed in Kentucky. Broadway Christian Church v. Commonwealth,
112 Ky. 448, 454, 66 S.W. 32, 33 (1902) ("When the framers of the Constitution undertook to define in exact terms what
should be exempt, we are not at liberty to add to the terms which they selected with so much care and precision.").
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costing less in yearly tax assessments than the applicant may have spent to drive with
an attorney to Columbus for a hearing on the property!212
Vii. CONCLUSION
The focus of this Note is not to promote one standard for exemption over
another, but rather to promote the enactment of firmly constructed statutes. Whether
the exemption statute is to require exclusive use or mere ownership, whether Ohio is
to exempt church property or any property, the procedure is clear: it is for the
legislature to establish the statutory requirements and for the judiciary to interpret
them reasonably. By altering exemption requirements to satisfy its view of justice,
the court has created an administrative and judicial quagmire. As a result, the state
is being forced to spend ever-increasing sums of money to discover whether in any
particular situation the state should be denied future revenue.
The Ohio Supreme Court has entered a game from which it cannot bow out. The
court has interpreted the exemption statutes, written in clear language, parallel to that
of the Ohio Constitution, beyond any reasonable limits. As the system of real
property taxation and exemption stands today, time and money are being wasted in
the case-by-case legislating that has arisen from overly flexible judicial interpretation.
More importantly, real property is being removed from the tax lists, further reducing
the tax base while raising the burden for those whose property remains on the lists.
Whatever decisions are reached in Ohio regarding exemption standards, the legisla-
ture will have to make them. The system as it stands is inequitable, and the stakes are
too high for the legislature to fold its hand.
John R. Cummins
212. See, e.g., Moraine Heights Baptist Church v. Kinney, 12 Ohio St. 3d 134,465 N.E.2d 1281 (1984). According
to the DTE files, the Moraine Heights church rests on 49 acres of land. The property supporting the church (actually a
tabernacle) was assessed at a value of $21,000. The state employs a figure at 35% of the assessed value to obtain the
taxable value of the land. Here, the taxable value is equal to $7,350. The millage for Greene County, where the tabernacle
is located, is approximately 40 mills. Thus, the church sought exemption that was worth approximately $300 per year.
DTE Case #JE 951, filed on 2-28-79, Journal entry on 10-3-80.
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